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Abstract
The rise of populist movements across the globe has instigated considerable research interest into populism, predomi-
nantly in Western democracies. Non-democratic Russia, however, is not exempt from this populist trend, and distinguish-
able populist rhetoric can be observed both inside and outside the establishment. Alexey Navalny, who regularly organises
mass protests in Russia, is considered to be an outsider of systemic politics. Despite several unsuccessful attempts to be
elected, his popularity continues to grow, largely due to digital instruments such as YouTube. In light of limited press free-
dom, YouTube has become one of the most trustworthy platforms for Navalny to publish his investigative documentaries
about Russian corruption. In his videos, Navalny adopts a populist communication style to oppose himself to Putin’s ‘cor-
rupt’ elite. Different investigative journalism practices help Navalny to discredit the establishment, whereas his activist
appeals may motivate his supporters to engage in political action. In this article, I explore how Navalny combines the prac-
tices of investigative journalism and civic activism in his populist communication on YouTube. Using themethod of content
analysis, I explore a case study of Navalny’s YouTube communication and reveal four types of populism which play a spe-
cial role in his narration. These are ‘superficial,’ ‘investigative,’ ‘radical,’ and ‘advocacy’ populisms. Advocacy populism, for
instance, provides evidence of corruption elite crimes through journalism practices and in calling people to political action.
The most visible concentration of these parts of narration was observed in YouTube videos released by the activist before
and during anti-corruption protests of 2017.
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1. Introduction
2021 marks three decades since the Soviet Union disso-
lution, which has changed the political trajectories of all
countries of the former Soviet bloc. Russia, as a succes-
sor of the Soviet Union, has undergone several political
transformations since, including changes in its communi-
cation about politics. The relative press freedom in post-
Glasnost Russia increased transparency in political com-
munication (PC) from 1986 to the 1990s. However, after
the Soviet structure’s dissolution this openness was pro-
gressively curtailed. It was replaced by limited freedom
of speech, elimination, harassment, aswell as censorship
of dissident journalists and media (Becker, 2004).
A growth in authoritarian tendencies in Russia has
been well-documented in 2019 (Repucci, 2019). While
undoubtedly a matter of concerns for some, it has also
led to the emergence of new hybrid communication
projects that oppose mainstream narratives using digital
technologies. Opposition leader Alexey Navalny stands
exemplar of someone who creatively uses communica-
tion tools and populist discourses to challenge the domi-
nant political elite—a strategy he has employed since ris-
ing to popularity in the 2010s (Gel’man, 2015).
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Navalny established himself as a key oppositional fig-
ure during the mass protests of 2011–2012, which oc-
curred in response to Russia’s parliamentary and presi-
dential elections. The various opposition forces united
then towards two common goals: the reconsideration
of the parliamentary election results and the resigna-
tion of high-ranking officials. Among prominent figures
at the protests were activists such as Nemtsov, Kasyanov,
Dmitry and Gennady Gudkovs, and Navalny himself. The
enthusiasm of protesters and activists quickly faded as
protesters realised they were far from succeeding their
goals (Gel’man, 2015). Due to harassment, most of these
opposition figures have been less prominent in the pub-
lic sphere of the 2010s than Navalny. He managed to
remain a popular, ‘non-systemic’ politician in Russia—
in essence, a non-elected politician operating outside of
the political system.
Despite frequent harassment, Navalny published nu-
merous journalistic investigations of Russian politicians’
corruption on his social media platforms—an act which
resonated across several publics. These were the inves-
tigations into the corruption cases of Russian General
Prosecutor Chaika, businessman Deripaska and former
Deputy PMPrihod’ko and others. Themost resonant doc-
umentary on his channel about former Prime Minister
(PM)Medvedev led to several large-scale protests across
major Russian metropoles in 2017. These were the
first regular, mass anti-government protests to occur—
reminiscent of the events in 2011–2012. Unlike his op-
position colleagues, Navalny managed to secure a com-
munication strategy of attracting anti-governmentmove-
ment supporters, which involved different communica-
tion instruments.
This article addresses the following research ques-
tion: how does Navalny combine practices of inves-
tigative journalism (IJ) and digital activism in his pop-
ulist communication on YouTube? The text transcripts of
Navalny’s YouTube videos containing these practices, re-
leased during his campaign for the 2018 presidential elec-
tion, are studied through themethod of content analysis.
In addition to the narration, which can be considered as
one of the representations of political performance (Rai,
2015), the visual aesthetics of stage, body politics (cloth-
ing style), and colour of Navalny’s YouTube populist per-
formance are explored elsewhere (Glazunova, 2020).
This case study contributes to the evolving corpus
of literature on digital media in PC of authoritarian and
semi-authoritarian countries. Social media is seen as a
more flexible, provoking, and transformative space for
diversified communication, particularly in light of limited
press freedom.
2. Political Communication Shifts
Research into Navalny’s communication is situated in
the field of PC. At its most basic level, PC is purposeful
communication about politics involving different interest
groups. As a phenomenon, it has significantly changed
in the 21st century, where many shifts are currently be-
ing observed. Three of them have a direct relation to
Navalny’s communication. Firstly, according to Blumler
(2013), we now live in an age characterised by the exten-
sive use of Internet facilities in communication, where
newly emerged social media platforms have ‘shaken’ the
established rules of PC. Secondly, in this new PC envi-
ronment, trust in news media and global press freedom
continues to decline (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos,
& Nielsen, 2019; Repucci, 2019). Investigative reporting
can play a ‘watchdog’ role in society, where general cov-
erage of mainstream media fails to follow democratic
principles of unbiased and transparent coverage. Lastly,
many politicians have started to spread populist mes-
sages increasingly, emphasising the purported antago-
nism between two populist entities of ‘the people’ vs.
‘the elite’ in them. Navalny stands out as a prominent ex-
ample of these observed changes in Russia’s PC.
2.1. Digital Media as an Emergent Actor of Political
Communication
Citizens, media, and actors seeking political power are
considered the major PC actors in exchanging political
messages (McNair, 2011). Their history can be traced
back for hundreds of years. New actors such as social me-
dia platforms appeared later, in the Internet-abundant
age of PC (Blumler, 2013). Kaplan and Haenlein (2010,
p. 61) defined ‘social media’ as “a group of Internet-
based applications that build on the ideological and tech-
nological foundations of Web 2.0 and that allow the cre-
ation and exchange of user-generated content.” Social
media can be considered as a separate actor of PC, fol-
lowing the logic of Schrape (2016, p. 13), who stipulates
that “the character limit on Twitter or the algorithmic cu-
ration on these social networking platforms as well as
on media streaming portals…are not just technical gim-
micks but rather social structure elements that are in-
corporated in the platform design.” These social struc-
ture elements can play a crucial role in communication
about politics.
One of the prominent areas of the research of
social media and politics is in the field of digital ac-
tivism and social movements. In Russia, for example,
during the 2011–2012 protests ‘for fair elections,’ it
was found that platforms like Facebook mostly helped
to mobilise supporters for the anti-regime demonstra-
tions (White & McAllister, 2014). Nevertheless, the
Russian government was also effective in countering
protestswith information and communications technolo-
gies (Spaiser, Chadefaux, Donnay, Russmann, & Helbing,
2017). Notably, these protests were a trigger for the
government to further regulate mainstream media and
online spaces. Opposition figures like Navalny, who
are unsuccessful in being elected, continue to oper-
ate from the ‘ghetto’ (Gel’man, 2013); deploying al-
ternative digital communication instruments including
YouTube channels.
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Launched in 2005, YouTube (later a Google sub-
sidiary) quickly became the dominant platform in the
global social media market (Burgess & Green, 2018). In
2019, YouTube was the most popular digital platform in
Russia (Statista, 2019). As a consequence of the declin-
ing trust in Russian mainstream media—and TV in par-
ticular (FOM, 2018)—YouTube has also become an alter-
native news medium for Russians, promoting “visually
motivated, amateur-driven news culture that alters the
truth claims of news and the professional hegemony of
news making” (Sumiala & Tikka, 2013, p. 318). In Russia,
YouTube gives a voice to amateur, grassroots, citizen, and
investigative journalists such as Navalny, who expose cor-
ruption and power abuse in the country.
2.2. Investigative Journalism and Its Watchdog Role
In its 2019 report, Freedom House (Repucci, 2019) ob-
served a global trend of declining press freedom. In au-
thoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes, who are fu-
elling this decline (such as Russia), the toolbox of me-
dia regulation by the state includes: government-backed
ownership takeovers, threats against journalists, licens-
ing practices abuse, and other measures (Repucci, 2019).
As a result, the need for quality, watchdog IJ arises, which
may contribute to challenging the status quo coverage
of politics.
To be identified as falling within the investigative
genre, a story should be centred on the public inter-
est “by exposing abuses of power in society” (Carson,
2019, p. 65). Moreover, IJ always requires greater time,
money, and effort from journalists compared to less
complex journalistic genres of conducting investigations
(Carson, 2019, p. 66). De Burgh (2008, p. 16) calls these
journalistic skills ‘desk skills,’ meaning that journalists
should have “the thorough knowledge of information
sources and types and the rules that govern them, the
ability to read documents for significance, and an un-
derstanding of statistics.” In addition, journalists would
need to apply a higher level of scrutiny, verify facts,
and look for legitimate sources of information (Carson,
2019, p. 66). Journalists are believed to have a hier-
archy of evidence, where each information source has
its own weight (Ettema & Glasser, 1984, p. 17). The
prominent display of collected ‘evidence’ is considered
in this article as one of the crucial indicators of IJ in
Navalny’s performance.
In a digitised world, journalists need to adapt to
new sources, instruments, and channels of information.
Depending on the instruments, new sub-types of IJ
have emerged; including data journalism, drone jour-
nalism, and others types. Data journalism, for example,
is “a form of storytelling where traditional journalistic
working methods are mixed with data analysis, program-
ming, and visualisation techniques” (Nygren, Appelgren,
& Hüttenrauch, 2012, as cited in Appelgren & Nygren,
2014, p. 394). Famous cases of cross-national investiga-
tions such as the Panama Papers showed that big data
leaks followed by a concerted effort of journalists work-
ing across borders, can help to hold politicians and gov-
ernments accountable (Carson, 2019).
In the post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe,
which Russia is closer to in a political and cultural sense,
watchdog reporting operates in a state where “the al-
ready resource-weak news organisations” become “even
weaker” (Stetka & Örnebring, 2013, p. 414). Stetka and
Örnebring (2013) suggest that the number of investiga-
tive journalists in the country tends to be correlated
to the level of media freedom observed; the freer the
media, the higher the number of investigative journal-
ists. They distinguished two major types of IJ in Eastern
Europe: mainstream media organisations, as well as
Internet-based outlets and projects. The second type of
journalism was represented in Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia,
and Romania, countries with ‘partly-free’ press at that
time (Stetka & Örnebring, 2013).
Russian critical journalists, in turn, associate them-
selves with opposition and propagate freedom of speech
(Repnikova, 2018). The examples of relatively liberal or
oppositional outlets include, e.g., the online newspaper
Meduza (whose headquarters are located in Latvia) and
the newspaperNovayaGazeta, known for its high-profile
investigations about political topics. Navalny’s engage-
ment on YouTube can be considered as a unique and al-
ternativemedia project that can potentially contribute to
awatchdog role of journalism in the country—combining
investigative reporting practices with a call to collective
political action for invoking systemic change. In countries
with limited press freedom, activists and independent
journalists may need to pursue two political goals simul-
taneously: to overcome restrictions on media freedom
and to advocate their essential political rights.
Furthermore, Houston (2010, p. 45) notes that IJ is in-
herently populist and adversarial in its nature, “challeng-
ing the powers that be.” By exposing the power abuse
and corruption of the ‘villains,’ protecting the ‘victims’
(Carson, 2019) and their public interest by sometimes
more radically inviting people to action, IJ shares an inter-
sectionwith populism that is based on the antagonism of
‘the people’ and ‘the elite.’ As this article will continue to
demonstrate, Navalny has skilfully made use of this inter-
section for his political purposes.
2.3. Rise of Populist Narratives
There are diverse ways of defining populism. Different
scholars understand populism as an ideology (Mudde,
2004), a logic (Laclau, 2005), a discourse (Laclau &
Mouffe, 1985), a philosophy (Inglehart & Norris, 2016),
and a political style (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014) among
others. I follow de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann,
and Stayner’s (2018) notion, which distinguish between
the ‘style’ and the ‘content’ of populism. The former is
“a set of presentational style elements,” while the lat-
ter is “public communication of core components of pop-
ulist ideology (such as people-centrism and anti-elitism)”
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(de Vreese et al., 2018, p. 425). This definition allows
for measuring degrees of populism in discourses (de
Vreese et al., 2018, p. 426), which aligns with this arti-
cle’s objectives.
In this study, I focus on Navalny’s populist ideologi-
cal content. Most authors understand people-centrism
as referring to ‘the people,’ where ‘people’ are the pri-
mary source of legitimate power (Bonikowski & Gidron,
2016) and sovereignty (Jagers &Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt
& Tormey, 2014). Using this style of communication, pop-
ulists associate themselves with ‘the people’ by appeal-
ing or referring to them. This project focusses specifically
on the empirical indicators of ‘the people’ in texts that
are often represented by pronouns like ‘we’ and ‘us.’ In
critical discourse analysis, the use of such pronouns is
explained by the desire of the politician “to assimilate
‘the people’ to the leader, or the leadership” (Fairclough,
2001, p. 180). Addressing the people can also be ex-
pressed through mass nouns such as ‘people,’ ‘citizens,’
‘voters,’ ‘taxpayers,’ and others.
The populist appeal is distinctly political. Politicians
addressing ‘the people’ usually want some form of direct
or indirect action from them. They want citizens to vote
in someone’s favour, to protest, to disseminate informa-
tion, and conduct other actions. This ‘call to action’ is a
radical form of appeal to ‘the people’ in populist commu-
nications, and it can be vital to the success of increasing
political participation among audiences.
Anti-elitism is another central element of populism.
The typical anti-elite descriptions within populism state
that elites are distant from ‘the people,’ associated with
the external enemy (‘us’ vs. ‘them’), politically incom-
petent, and indifferent to the public interest—in ef-
fect; saboteurs, corruptors, and betrayers of public trust
(Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).
Populists can refer to the elite more generally with col-
lective pronouns and nouns such as ‘they,’ ‘the govern-
ment,’ ‘the establishment,’ and ‘the elite’—but they can
also target particular individuals, groups of people, and
institutions of political power. In Navalny’s communica-
tion, it is clear that populists can discredit elites. They can
simply bring them into disrepute by using words such as
‘crooks’ and ‘thieves,’ or by providing arguments and pur-
ported evidence of elites’ crimes and misconduct. In the
latter case, investigative and advocacy journalists also
use evidence to expose the ‘villains.’
Navalny uses an investigative genre; employing some
evidence of corruption found on social media, the
Internet, and other sources to expose Putin’s elite. He
also publishes predominately on digital channels, which
reflects Gerbaudo’s (2017) idea of ‘cyber-populism’ that
enables spaces via digital media platforms (free from the
state), where citizens can gather and be mobilised for
political action. Gerbaudo (2018, p. 746) argues that so-
cial media platforms “have offered a channel for the pop-
ulist yearning to ‘represent the unrepresented.”’ Among
these platforms, YouTube is still overlooked in populism
research on ‘political’ Facebook and Twitter represented
by studies such as Engesser, Ernst, Esser, and Büchel
(2017), Waisbord and Amado (2017), Jacobs, Sandberg,
and Spierings (2019), and others. However, the perfor-
mative, participative, and sometimes radical nature of
the platform allows for creating and spreading populist
counter-narratives in countries like Russia.
Finally, Navalny’s ideas exist within the framework
of authentic Russian populism. The first mentions of
populism in the Russian context were connected with
the movement of Narodniks (‘narod’ means ‘people’ in
Russian) in the late 19th—early 20th centuries. Russian
intellectual classes in the late 19th century practised
what is known as ‘goings to the people.’ They vis-
ited ordinary peasants in villages, propagated distrust
in religion, rebuked the authority of the tsar and de-
nounced samoderzhavie (autocracy). Modern Russian
politicians oppose their counter-elite and seek active
feedback from voters. The distinction of ‘us’ and ‘them’
in Putin’s rhetoric has gone several transformations.
‘Them’ has previously referred to terrorists, the West
and the US in particular; now it is applied to the op-
posing liberals referred to as ‘Fifth Column’ (Kolesnikov,
Kortunov, & Snegovaya, 2018). The opposition move-
ment of 2011–2012 has also resorted to populist rhetoric
in their struggle against Putin’s regime (Gel’man, 2015).
The latter, as Gel’man (2015) argued, contributed to the
re-birth of Russian opposition in the beginning of the
2010s, during the protests when the opposition project
of Navalny emerged.
3. Alexey Navalny and the Russian Political
Communication Ecosphere
The protests ‘for fair elections’ led to further restrictions
of citizens’ political rights, mass media, and the Internet
introduced by the Russian establishment. Mainstream
media started to be further controlled by a mixture of
business and administrative measures—a process that
has started back in the 1990s (Becker, 2004). The Internet
was usually acknowledged as a freer space for alterna-
tive political discourses in Russia (Etling, Alexanyan, Kelly,
Farris, & Gasser, 2010). However, the Agora (2018) re-
port states that in 2017, 244 webpages in the RuNet
(Russian Internet) were blocked every day, every six days
users were harassed or threatened, and every eight days
Russian courts sentenced someone to prison in relation
to ‘misbehaviour’ on the Internet (Agora, 2018).
In this environment Navalny’s popularity continues
to grow, despite his status as an outsider of systemic
politics. (Levada, 2017). At the beginning of 2020, his
personal blog on YouTube had more than three million
subscribers. Several strategies could be observed in his
communication with audiences. Firstly, Navalny was still
using populist strategies in his rhetoric, apparent since
2011. His recent populist performances echo the activi-
ties of Russian populism’s founding fathers—Narodnik’s
movement. To promote anti-establishment sentiments
in a contemporary context, Navalny releases a YouTube
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video using similar rhetoric instead of physical ‘goings to
the people.’
Secondly, he extensively employs digital instruments
in communicating his message to a peripheral electorate.
YouTube is not the only platform that the activist and
his team use for communication. However, among all of
them, YouTube stands as a relatively free medium that
reaches a broad audience across Russia and affords op-
portunities to contest the regime. Facebook, Twitter, and
Google with its subsidiary YouTube (all major interna-
tional technology companies) are still relatively capable
of resisting the RuNet regulations according to an Agora
(2019) report. Finally, the format of investigations that
Navalny uses for his videos reaches the highest viewer-
ship on his channel. As of June 2020, the most popu-
lar videos on his channel are investigations into corrup-
tion of the former PM (34 million views), the General
Prosecutor (12 million views), North Caucasus officials
(11 million views), and others. As this article has argued,
these strategies can contribute to securing his survival in
the Russian public sphere.
4. Methodology
4.1. Methods
This article investigates the case study of populist com-
munication of Alexey Navalny using the method of con-
tent analysis. The method was used historically for the
investigation of media texts, or to “yield inferences
from all kinds of verbal, pictorial, symbolic, and com-
munication data” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 17). As I work
with Navalny’s communication and conversational data
(namely videos and deriving from them texts that require
rearticulating or reinterpretation of the messages to un-
derstand Navalny’s phenomenon better), content analy-
sis is the most suitable research method for this study.
Krippendorff (2012) doubts the dichotomy of quali-
tative and quantitative content analyses. He notes that
“all reading of texts is qualitative by nature,” and using
computers to analyse them does not make them any less
qualitative (p. 22). The qualitative dimension of content
analysis is sometimes called ‘interpretive’ (Krippendorff,
2004, p. 17). Through the close reading of “relatively
small amounts of textual matter” (Krippendorff, 2004,
p. 17), interpretation of texts into new narratives, and
culturally conditioned understandings, new inferences
of the text are drawn, with newmeanings depending per-
haps on the theoretical lens. In this research, the quanti-
tative part helped to answer what words and how often
they occurred, whereas the qualitative part—through a
process of close reading—involved interpreting and con-
textualising Navalny’s communication phenomenon.
The drawbacks of measuring populism by content
analysis were described by Pauwels (2011). They in-
clude high labour intensity, coder subjectivity, and un-
reliability (Pauwels, 2011, p. 98). This project addresses
these issues, including the ambiguity of the populist
phenomenon and the distinctive political context that
frames Navalny’s communication.
4.2. Data
The main data consisted of Navalny’s YouTube videos
in transcript form. His channel has existed since 2013.
However, I was interested in more recent communica-
tions of the activist, connected primarily to his presi-
dential electoral campaign (from December 13, 2016,
until the fourth inauguration of President Putin on
May 7, 2018). This was the period during which Navalny
was most active, thus containing the maximum concen-
tration of posts, including his major investigations on
Russian corruption. In these 18 months, Navalny posted
150 videos of varying length. I purposefully shortlisted
his most viewed videos, which potentially can have a
bigger impact on the audience through their reach; i.e.,
those above the median of 1,600,000 views. This re-
sulted in 77 videos selected for the sample.
All of the 77 videos were narrated in the Russian lan-
guage. The total number of words in the selected sam-
ple is 83,023 words. The total time length of the selected
video sample is 10 hours, 43 minutes, and 7 seconds.
The shortest video is 46 seconds long, where Navalny ad-
dresses his audience from Simonov’s Court. The longest
video is 49 minutes and 38 seconds and describes the in-
vestigation into corruption of the former Russian PM.
Parts of the videos where Navalny narrated directly
to the camera were most prevalent across the videos.
However, his videos were frequently interspersed with
content from other people’s speeches into the narrative
structure. For this research, I chose the excerpts that con-
tain only Navalny’s direct speech (narration). In total, 331
excerpts among the 77 most viewed videos were iden-
tified and subsequently coded in content analysis soft-
ware NVivo.
4.3. Coding Categories
To ensure a nuanced understanding of Navalny’s narra-
tion, four coding categories were developed. The two
main categories for coding, ‘appeal to the people’ and
‘discrediting the elites’ as explained in Section 2.3, were
subdivided into two further categories each. An ‘appeal
to the people’ was sub-categorised based on the way
the appeal to ‘the people’ was communicated, as well as
the level of radicalisation of the populist call, distinguish-
ing between the categories ‘simple addressing’ and ‘call
to action.’ The category ‘discrediting the elites’ was split
into ‘empty discrediting’ and ‘discrediting with evidence’
to explore the presence of journalistic investigation prac-
tices that Navalny uses to discredit elites. Therefore, a
total of four categories were coded in the excerpts.
‘Simple addressing’ is a process where a politician
(Navalny specifically) is merely talking to people and in-
vites them to a conversation through the video. He ad-
dresses them to associate himself with the audience. In
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this case, he does not invite them to a political or an-
other form of action. He uses simple addressing forms
using the pronouns ‘we’ and ‘us’ as part of the narration
(example: “Putin studiously ignores us, he keeps repeat-
ing that we don’t have any propositions or a construc-
tive agenda’’).
‘Call to action’ is a radical form of appealing to the
people, including an invitation to political action. The
call presupposes the subsequent action the populist com-
municator expects from the audience expressed in ac-
tion verbs (e.g., to boycott, to vote). A narrator might
use the imperative mood to indicate motivating or mo-
bilising supporters around his/her political goals. The ex-
cerpts containing a ‘call to action’ contain ‘simple ad-
dressing,’ too. This overlapping is explained by the fact
that in calling people to action, a communicator can
use simple words like ‘we’ and ‘us’ which are consid-
ered as simple forms of addressing people (example: “On
May 5th, I urge all of you to participate in demonstra-
tions, rallies and protests for our right to be the citizens
of our country’’).
‘Empty discrediting’ is the attempt of a populist to
discredit elites, yet this attempt is merely an allegation
not supported by evidence, and consists of accusations
and denigrations of thosewho formpart of the elite (e.g.,
calling someone a ‘crook’ or a ‘thief’). In this project, to
‘discredit’ is understood as ceasing to respect someone
or believing an idea or person (example: “Onlywe can op-
pose this ghoul who’s dragging us into poverty and turn-
ing Russia into a third world country, just so he can stay
in charge and keep getting that fake percentage”).
‘Discrediting with evidence’ is the attempt to dis-
credit the elite through claims that are supported by ev-
idence of a journalistic format, including materials from
social media, websites, official documents of the govern-
ment, and other types of evidence. A narrator should
refer to them in his/her texts. ‘Discrediting with evi-
dence’ a priori contains the category ‘empty discredit-
ing,’ as Navalny uses words denigrating the elite (e.g.,
‘crooks,’ ‘thieves’), but also provides evidence collected
through journalistic practices in the same excerpt (exam-
ple: “While I do it, we’ll also entertain you with some
footage of Usmanov’s mansion, so you’ll get a chance to
see how Russian oligarchs live”).
Thus, four categories of the ideological content of
populism are presented in Figure 1. According to the
description of the categories and Figure 1, there were
overlapping categories, such as a ‘call to action’ con-
taining forms of ‘simple addressing’ as well as ‘discredit-
ing with evidence’ which consists of ‘empty discrediting.’
Both coders involved in the process considered those
facts but counted only unique and dual combinations
of the four categories in the sample, as Table 1 will fur-
ther demonstrate.
4.4. Reliability
To reach an inter-coder agreement, another Russian
speaker was consulted for the coding process. However,
Coder 2 did not need a full sample of the excerpts;
it could be reached through a representative sub-sample
calculated via a specific formula. The agreement was
reached through a representative sub-sample calculated
using Riffe, Lacy, and Fico’s (2014, p. 111) formula as seen
in Figure 2. This resulted in a sub-sample of 89 excerpts,
chosen randomly out of the aforementioned total of 331.
Ideological content of populism
Appealing to the people
Simpe addressing
Low
Level of radicalisaon Presence of evidence collected through invesgave
journalisc pracces
High No
evidence
Provided
evidence
Call to acon Empty discreding Discreding with evidence
Discreding the elite
Figure 1. Ideological elements of populism in Navalny’s videos: Categories for coding.
Table 1. Types of populisms in Navalny’s narration based on the combination of populism sub-categories.
Discrediting the elite/appeal to ‘the people’ Simple addressing Call to action
Empty discrediting Superficial populism (102) Radical populism (57)
Discrediting with evidence Investigative populism (47) Advocacy populism (11)
Note: The number in brackets represents the number of combinations that appeared in Navalny’s video excerpts.
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n = (N− 1)(SE)
2 + PQN
(N− 1)(SE)2 + PQ
Figure 2. The formula for the calculation of sub-sample for reproducibility test. Note: n = the size of sub-sample; N = total
number of the whole sample; P = desirable level of agreement; SE = standard error; Q = 1 − P.
The formula depended on three key factors of inter-
coder agreement: the total number of text components
to be coded, the desired level of agreement and the confi-
dence level desired for the test.N= 331 for this research
stage, SE= 0,03 is determined by the level of significance
(0.95) and the z-score associated (using the one-tailed
version) is 1.64. The desirable level of agreement was
0.7,with the level of confidence being 0.8. The calculated
sub-sample with these parameters was 89. Therefore,
89 main excerpts out of 331 were chosen randomly us-
ing the online Research Randomizer (Social Psychology
Network, n.d.).
The level of agreement was measured for each one
of the four categories of populist content. The results of
the coding process were transferred to SPSS to calculate
Krippendorff’s alpha (2004). The standards for data relia-
bility, according to Krippendorff (2004), are that a score
between𝛼= 0.667 to𝛼= 0.800 is considered as substan-
tial, and a score above 𝛼 = 0.800 is considered as perfect
agreement. Considering that I explored the ambiguous
phenomenon of populism (which had many interpreta-
tions), I aimed at reaching a score of 𝛼 = 0.750. In all
four categories, the inter-coder agreement reached was
as follows: ‘simple addressing’ (0.7943), ‘call to action’
(0.8825), ‘empty discrediting’ (0.7802), and ‘discrediting
with evidence’ (0.7700). This means that the data is reli-
able and reproducible.
Having four variables (categories) for the analysis re-
sulted in the formation of four combinations of pop-
ulism categories. I named these according to Table 1 and
counted them in NVivo.
4.5. Overview
I constructed the quantitative data’s meaning through
the qualitative procedures of close reading of the re-
search’s sub-sample. I looked at how Navalny addressed
‘the people,’ what he called these people to do, how
he discredited the elite, and what evidence he used to
discredit them. Each type of populism (as per Table 1)
appeared in a different number of excerpts. The inten-
sive nature of the qualitative part of the analysis made
it impractical to analyse all 331 excerpts. I pre-defined
the size of the purposive sample for close reading pro-
cedures as follows: ‘superficial’ populism (20 excerpts),
‘radical’ populism (10 excerpts), ‘investigative’ populism
(10 excerpts), and ‘advocacy’ populism (10 excerpts). The
excerpts were chosen through random sampling using
the web-tool Research Randomizer (Social Psychology
Network, n.d.). The summaries of these excerpts were
used to develop a deeper understanding of Navalny’s
populist narrative andwhat it means for Russia’s broader
PC ecosphere.
5. Four Types of Populism in Navalny’s YouTube
Narration
This section will look closely at the main characteristics
of these populist excerpts, including their meaning, top-
ics, and structure, to define what each type of populism
means in Navalny’s narration.
5.1. Superficial Populism
‘Superficial’ populism is located at ‘the surface’ of
Navalny’s narration. The excerpts do not require a lot
of effort to create by their narrators and investigators.
Navalny does not provide evidence of crimes committed
by the elite, or motivate people to engage in activism
through radical appeals in these excerpts. In some ways,
this could also be referred to as ‘passive’ populism,which
does not require specific actions from the narrator or
the audience.
These excerpts can link other parts of narration or
serve as the introduction to the investigations or radical
appeals. 20 excerpts in the sample are short in length; on
average, 197 words each. The longest excerpt within the
sample is 738 words, whereas the shortest is 35 words.
They are usually located at the beginning and/or in the
middle of narration. The themes of these excerpts are
also diffused and cover topics from corruption to elec-
tions. The elite’s critique has a personalised and diffused
nature. It targetsmany different actors of the elite—from
executive power to corrupt media representatives.
In these excerpts, there is a simple level of associa-
tion of Navalny with ‘the people’ through the words ‘we’
and ‘us,’ which may indicate Navalny’s intention to build
one collective identity opposed to the elite. These princi-
ples lie at the heart of populist ideology, and they can ex-
plain the dominance of these excerpts in Navalny’s pop-
ulist narration. This also reflects the fact that this pop-
ulism may be communicated in as little as one or sev-
eral words, simply by calling someone a ‘thief,’ a ‘liar,’
or using personal pronouns. The example of the super-
ficial excerpt criticising main Navalny’s rival, Putin, reads
as follows:
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Thank you, everyone, who participated, organised,
and helped. I congratulate you with successful
(protest) action in number and geographical scope.
We showed that even if Russia is entering the fifth
term of Putin, here, there are many of those who are
not ready to turn into zombies or became a slave of
the self-proclaimed tzar. (Navalny, 2018a)
5.2. Investigative Populism
In these excerpts, Navalny uses investigative journalis-
tic tools to discredit the elite, providing textual refer-
ences to the evidence of their crimes collected through
journalistic practices. ‘Investigative’ populism excerpts
are of medium length compared to other excerpts: the
shortest excerpt is 116 words, whereas the longest ex-
cerpt is 733 words. The average excerpt in the sample
is 316 words. Usually, they are located in the middle of
the narration.
Navalny uses many anti-corruption symbols in the
texts, including luxurious properties and items that he
claims officials possess. He provides examples of the cor-
ruption crimes and nepotism of the elites, referring in
his claims to a substantial base of journalistic evidence.
He employs social media data, photos, interviews, peo-
ple’s CVs, and other forms of journalistic evidence. He
mentions these forms of evidence in his narration, but
the visual presence of such evidence was not analysed in
this research.
The most referred form of evidence in this sample
was the drone video footage. Video is one of the trust-
worthy forms of evidence for IJ (Ettema & Glasser, 1984).
Drone footage can be one of the most accessible jour-
nalistic instruments available to Navalny and his team; it
also requires advanced skills of drone journalism as out-
lined in his videos:
But today I have something new for you. Many of you,
of course, remember that recently we bought a new
cool quadcopter and as soon as it arrived we started
to figure out how it works, started to learn how to use
it, and finally we did a test flight. We decided not to
send it into a ‘foreign’ trip or for a super difficult task,
but just to test it on the ‘old object,’ which we shoot
before but only with photos. (Navalny, 2018b)
Even based on this small sample, it is evident that
Navalny usually uses modern and digital technologies—
when investigating the elites’ purported crimes—due to
their effectiveness, comparatively low cost, as well as
relevance to the YouTube medium. Curating, processing
and presenting the data for his investigation may require
significantly more time and work on behalf of Navalny
and his team—this is a characteristic constitute of IJ.
The simplicity of addressing the people in these excerpts
presupposes associating the narrator with the audience
through the personal pronouns and nouns, as in ‘super-
ficial’ populism. The discrediting attacks of the elite in
these excerpts have a personalised character and target
particular people, such as the former PMMedvedev.
5.3. Radical Populism
‘Radical’ populism excerpts contain characteristics of cit-
izen activism propagated by Navalny. These excerpts
greatly vary in their text length within the sample:
from 89 words to 1,000 words. The approximate aver-
age length of the excerpts is 400 words. The excerpts
seemed to be located towards the end of his narration—
emphasising the strongmessage or an appeal directed to
‘the people.’
Most of these excerpts were connected to elections.
They form a crucial part of Russia’s political ecosystem,
which both the ruling elite and the non-systemic opposi-
tion take seriously. Within the same electoral period in
which the sample was taken, Navalny invites people to
first participate and vote in elections, and then to boycott
them—just as when he was barred from the 2018 elec-
tion. Ironically, both calls intend to safeguard the demo-
cratic meaning of this institution.
This small sample of excerpts also contains different
forms of ‘offline’ and ‘online’ calls to action. In his ‘of-
fline’ call, Navalny invites people to: boycott the elec-
tions (4), go to peaceful protests (3), become observers
at the elections (2), put down a signature for his nomi-
nation to the presidential elections (2), as well as other
actions (1). In his ‘online’ call, Navalny invites people to
subscribe to his YouTube channel (4), share the video (4),
as well as other online actions (2). The ‘offline’ calls are
mostly associated with political participation in elections
and protests. The ‘online’ calls are an everyday form of
digital action with political meaning which users can ex-
ercise in Russia without fear of persecution typical to the
Russian regime:
Take this video with the investigation and send it
to everyone, literally to everyone, post it every-
where where you can. This is our war of spread-
ing against their blocking, and we should win in this
war. Subscribe to our channel, we tell the truth here.
(Navalny, 2018c)
5.4. Advocacy Populism
‘Advocacy’ populism excerpts are located at the inter-
section of digital activism and IJ. Some IJ practices can
help to discredit the elite, whereas digital activism some-
times contains an appeal to ‘the people,’mostly in radical
forms. Advocacy populism excerpts are usually lengthy
(on average 1,064 words each) and located at the end
of narration, or they are full text transcripts of sole
YouTube videos.
The excerpts were the following parts of investiga-
tions into the elites’ corruption. They describe luxurious
properties, the elites’ nepotism, and provide evidence of
the elite’s corruption crimes. These excerpts contain el-
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ements of drone journalism; enabling a birds-eye view
of officials’ otherwise inaccessible properties. This has a
dramatic effect on YouTube users, who in all likelihood
have not seen this footage on any mainstream formats
in Russia.
However, Navalny does not only engage YouTube
users in his investigative story—hewants his audience to
act. He motivates people to act both ‘online’ and ‘offline’
in these excerpts:
On the 28th of January, I urge you all to participate in
the protest action in your city. Not for me, not about
me, but to protect your own right to participate in the
country’s life, the right at least once in six-year time to
ask from the authorities: ‘So where did you, bastards
take our oil money?’ Subscribe to our channel—we
tell the truth here. (Navalny, 2018d)
Some of his efforts, for example, the investigation into
the PM’s corruption—hismost popular videowith 30mil-
lion views (in June 2020)—led tomass protests organised
by Navalny in Russia in 2017. Interestingly, the concentra-
tion of released videos with advocacy excerpts occurred
before and during these protests. Navalny published his
investigation about the former PM on March 2, 2017,
which itself consisted of two advocacy excerpts. Then,
from this date until June 15, 2017, he published a further
five videos with ‘advocacy’ excerpts. During this time
period, Navalny organised two major anti-corruption
protests connected with the investigation on March 26
and June 12 in the same year, which were claimed to be
the biggest protests since those occurring in 2011–2012
(Pinchuk & Shurmina, 2017).
In sum, there is a strong and substantive message in
these parts of the videos which contains several calls to
action, general and personalised attacks of the elite, and
evidence of elitist corruption crimes collected through IJ
practices—which not onlymotivate people to act ‘online’
but sometimes can potentially encourage people to par-
ticipate in real, physical protests (as was seen in 2017).
6. Conclusion
This research has illuminated some of the major commu-
nication strategies that non-systemic opposition repre-
sentatives use to stay ‘afloat’ in the autocratic political
environment and to overcome political censorship and
limited media freedom. From a broader perspective, the
analysis of Navalny’s communication helps researchers
to determine whether there is ‘luft’ (from German ‘air’)
for spreading anti-establishment discourses in censored
Russian PC, and discern what communication strategies
types of non-systemic opposition in Russia favour its fight
for survival in the public sphere.
In Russia’s current political climate where dissident
elements of society are silenced, threatened, harassed,
or even eliminated, Navalny’s project marks a unique
change of pace in Russian opposition history in the last
decade. Many of his anti-corruption colleagues in the
2010s, who were active online in this area, disappeared
from the Russian public sphere due to harassment (Etling
et al., 2010; Knobel & Sanders, 2012).
In Navalny’s case, we see the use of digital pop-
ulist communication strategies to challenge Putin’s elite,
which has held power for 20 years. Navalny’s opposition
populism has distinctive features within Russian pop-
ulism in particular, and populism in general—combining
IJ and digital activism practices in his narration. Navalny’s
populist style not only demonstrates evidence of the
elite’s crimes but also invites citizens to participate in pol-
itics. Sometimes people react to this call, as was seen
in protests of 2017 inspired by Navalny’s YouTube doc-
umentary. By providing his audience with a variety of po-
litical actions in his narration, he shows pathways to polit-
ical change in a country usually resistant to them. Some
of the pathways are easy to implement with one click,
while others involve ‘physical’ political actions.
YouTube’s status as the most popular social me-
dia platform in Russia (Statista, 2019) provides Navalny
with a space for his anti-establishment sentiments. The
platform seems to negotiate with censorship and reg-
ulatory bodies. Therefore, it can leave space for anti-
corruption investigations such as Navalny’s. For instance,
it did not delete Navalny’s major resonant investigations,
and these are still available to YouTube users (Agora,
2019). In so doing, YouTube aids the preservation of anti-
corruption and anti-establishment discourses in Russia.
Navalny’s narration on YouTube is consonantwith the
notion of cyber-populism (Gerbaudo, 2017). Navalny is
a populist who claims a “bottom-up recuperation and
reclamation of democracy and political institutions by
ordinary citizens” (Gerbaudo, 2017, p. 485). He offers
a more authentic political participation than the ruling
elite allows. His communication brings diversity to a pub-
lic sphere monopolised by pro-government discourses.
His videos are highly viewed, accessible, and can be eas-
ily shared via the platform.
It is still doubtful and requires further investiga-
tion, whether his discourse can bring about the long-
lasting realisation of protest potential in Russia. Having
witnessed the tragic impact of revolutions in the last
century, and more specifically political and economic
crises in the 1990s, the Russian people became increas-
ingly hesitant to participate in protests with economic
(1998–2018) or political (2009–2018) demands in the fol-
lowing two decades, according to Levada’s (2020) sur-
vey. Despite the noticeable intensification of protest
potential in the last three years (Levada, 2020), the
establishment—afraid of protests and radical changes
to the political system—has also been effective in coun-
tering the protests. The introduction of restrictive laws
on mass gatherings as in 2012, the administrative bans
on local protests, or the mass arrests and harassment
of protesters (including Navalny himself) continue to
hamper the coherence and mass character of Russia’s
protest movement.
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Navalny has since become an example for other
activists—mostly his associates—to resist authoritarian
rule, activate the mobilising potential of citizens, and
advocate their political rights. This was evident during
the 2019 protests surrounding Moscow’s municipal elec-
tion. Three of Navalny’s associates—Sobol, Yashin, and
Zhdanov—were barred from registration in the election,
and organised mass protests in Moscow using digital in-
struments as part of their repertoire. Previously, it was
shown that his associates used the same visual style
as Navalny in their YouTube videos (Glazunova, 2020).
The events of this kind require further investigation into
activists’ narrations, to better assess the applicability
of Navalny’s populist template within the broader phe-
nomenon of Russian non-systemic opposition.
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